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THE CASE OF DR MOHAMED HANEEF:
AN AUSTRALIAN ‘TERRORISM DRAMA’ WITH BRITISH CONNECTIONS
Dr Mark Rix1
University of Wollongong
Abstract
This article examines the treatment of Dr Mohamed Haneef, an Indian doctor arrested
under Australia‟s anti-terrorism legislation in July 2007 as Australian authorities
including the Australian Federal Police, Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, (wrongfully) believed that
he was linked to the terrorist attack at Glasgow airport in June 2007. The actions and
responses of these two agencies, and the subsequent judicial inquiry are reviewed in
the light of the media‟s role and press coverage as the case unfolded.

Keywords: Australian anti-terrorism legislation, Clarke Judicial Inquiry, Glasgow
Airport attack, Counter-terrorism Legislation, Crimes Act 1914

Introduction
This paper begins with a brief overview of the Haneef case focusing on the major
events and characters involved as the drama unfolded. The overview also explains the
case‟s British connections because they are important to understanding the course
which the case took. It then moves on to consider Australia‟s counter-terrorism
strategy and the relevant aspects of the underpinning legislative framework, including
the terrorism offences it specifies, using the Haneef case to highlight important
elements of both the strategy and the framework. Here the roles and performance of
the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions CDPP will be central concerns. The role that the media played in the
1
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case will be a major theme running through the paper. The paper also provides a brief
analysis of the Clarke Judicial Inquiry into the case, including the recommendations it
produced, before concluding with some thoughts on how Australia‟s counter-terrorism
strategy might develop in the future.

The Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef
Dr Mohamed Haneef, an Indian doctor working as Senior House Officer at the Gold
Coast Hospital, Queensland, was arrested on 2 July 2007 and held without charge for
12 days under provisions of Australia‟s anti-terrorism legislation (specifically part 1C of
the Crimes Act, sections 23DA and 23CB). He was later charged (on 14 July) with one
offence of recklessly providing support to a terrorist organisation on the grounds that
his Subscriber Information Module (SIM) card was connected to failed terrorist attacks
in Britain (contrary to section 102.7(2) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code). On 25
July 2006, Dr Haneef had given his SIM card to his second cousin, Sabeel Ahmed, just
as he was about to leave Britain to travel to Bangalore to visit his family before
travelling to Australia to take up his position at the Gold Coast Hospital. The SIM card
was due to expire in August 2006, and accordingly Dr Haneef cancelled his direct debit
payment authorisation soon afterwards.2
On 30 June 2007, Sabeel Ahmed‟s brother, Kafeel Ahmed, crashed a jeep into the
entrance of Glasgow Airport from which he sustained serious burns leading to his
death on 2 August 2007. The day before the Glasgow Airport attack, police had
thwarted attempted car bombings outside two London nightclubs, in which Kafeel was
also a central figure. Sabeel was arrested by UK police on 30 June 2007 in connection
with the Glasgow attack and the failed London bombings, but did not tell them about
the email he had received from Kafeel which he read and opened soon after the
Glasgow attack (he was subsequently charged with withholding evidence). The email,
which became known as the „Jihad confession email‟, revealed Kafeel‟s intentions to
engage in Jihad but also demonstrated that Sabeel was completely ignorant of his
brother‟s plans. Kafeel wrote in the email „this is the project that I was working on for
some time now…everything else was a lie. And I hope you can all forgive me for being
2

Submission to Clarke Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef, Canberra, 21 November
2008, 14 (Stephen Keim) < http://www.haneefcaseinquiry.gov.au> at 31 July 2009.
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such a good liar. It was all necessary.‟3 The officers who arrested Dr Haneef alleged
that the SIM card that he had given to Sabeel was found in the jeep that Kafeel had
crashed into Glasgow Airport. This was later found to be incorrect, the SIM card being
located in Sabeel‟s home in Liverpool, England, at the time of his arrest.

The story of the incorrect allegation about the SIM card was broken by Rafael Epstein
of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation‟s AM programme on 20 July 2007.4 His
report showed that while the UK police had known for six days before Haneef was
charged, and soon after they began investigating Kafeel‟s activities, that the SIM card
was not found at the scene of the Glasgow Airport attack, no attempt had been made
by the AFP, the CDPP or the Queensland Police Service (QPS) to correct the story.5
They also seem to have ignored the Jihad email. In other words, the AFP, the CDPP
and, to a lesser extent, the QPS ignored evidence that Mohamed Haneef was
innocent. Writing in The Sydney Morning Herald in April 2008, David Marr observed
that
[t]he case against Dr Haneef always centred on allegations that his second
cousin Sabeel Ahmed, a doctor practising in England, was part of a terrorist
organisation. But in the Old Bailey on Friday [11 April] Mr Justice Calvert-Smith
accepted there was “no sign” of Ahmed “being an extremist or party to
extremist views”.6
Dr Haneef was granted bail on 16 July by Brisbane magistrate Jacquie Payne who
noted that „[t]here was no evidence before me the SIM card was used in any terrorist
activity‟ and „there have been no submissions to support the element of the offence
that the defendant was reckless‟.7 Magistrate Payne adjourned the criminal
proceedings until 31 August and Dr Haneef‟s lawyers applied to have the charge
struck out. While the CDPP agreed that the charge should be amended, it sought to
defer the amendment pending the committal mention date in August. Two days after
being charged, but within hours of the magistrate‟s ruling, the Immigration Minister

3

Email from Kafeel Ahmed to Sabeel Ahmed, 30 June 2007
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/the-jihad-confessionemail/2008/04/13/1208024978809.html> at 31 July 2009.
4
ABC Radio, „Haneef court information incorrect, source says‟, AM, 20 July 2007
<http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2007/s1983454.htm> at 31 July 2009.
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Kevin Andrews cancelled Haneef‟s 457 work visa because he failed the character test
of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (s501(3)), thus preventing his release from custody.
The following day Attorney-General Philip Ruddock issued a Criminal Justice Stay
Certificate under section 147 of the Migration Act that stopped Haneef from being
deported requiring him to remain in detention while the criminal proceedings against
him continued. Haneef was held in immigration detention and later home detention for
nearly two weeks, and then allowed to return voluntarily to India on 28 July despite his
visa remaining cancelled. However, the day before, on 27 July, the CDPP had
withdrawn the charge against Dr Haneef on the basis that there was
no prospect of making out any offence against Dr Haneef in respect of what
was alleged against him, either on the available information or the information
likely to be produced from pending investigations.‟8
The Attorney-General then accordingly cancelled the Criminal Justice Stay Certificate.
Justice Spender of the Federal Court of Australia set aside the visa cancellation
decision on 21 August 2007, a decision later upheld by the Full Bench of the Federal
Court in December 2007, dismissing an appeal by Andrews.9 The Full Bench observed
that Mr Andrews had „acted on a misapprehension of the proper construction of the
character provisions of the Migration Act.‟10 There is no scope in this paper to examine
in any depth the use of the Migration Act in the Haneef case. It should be noted,
however, that while Mr Andrews did not release relevant „protected information‟ to Dr
Haneef or to the court, he did release the same information to the media. 11 Federal
Court Justice Spender had been „[v]ery critical‟ of Andrews, observing in his judgement
that his actions denied Dr Haneef the opportunity „to challenge the information in a
meaningful way.‟12

The basic details of the Haneef case as just outlined, point to a number of very
important issues relating to the counter-terrorism legislation, and the criminal offences
it specifies that were used to detain, arrest and charge Mohamed Haneef, the
performance of the AFP and the CDPP, including their interaction, and the role of the
8

Submission to Clarke Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef, Canberra, 21 November
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9
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12
ibid.

129

political executive. Each of these will be considered in the course of investigating the
case.

The Counter-terrorism Legislation and Associated Criminal Offences and
Provisions
The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
Mohamed Haneef was arrested under subsection 3W(1) of the Crimes Act which
authorises an arresting officer to arrest a person for an offence only if the officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed the offence. The
arresting officer must also have reasonable grounds for the belief that the arrest is
necessary to ensure, among other things, the appearance by the person in a court or
prevent the person committing another offence. Subsection 3W(2) requires that the
arrested person be released if the arresting officer no longer has reasonable grounds
to believe either that the person committed the offence or that holding the person is
required to achieve such purposes.13 These statutory, or threshold tests, apply to all
criminal offences and thus are not lowered in terrorism cases. Moreover, „[t]here is no
special provision and test relating to terrorist offences.‟14 It is also important to realise
that the Crimes Act makes no provision for preventative detention.

Section 3(W) was inserted into the Crimes Act in 1994 (although elements of it can be
found in earlier versions of the Act dating back to 1926). Part 1C of the Act was
established in 1991 and Section 23CA in 2004 (inserted by the Anti-Terrorism Act
2004 (Cth)). In his report on the Haneef Case, Justice Clarke noted that while this
chronology of the Act‟s development might give some intuition into Parliament‟s intent
as to which clause should take precedence in the event of inconsistency, „it is far from
clear.‟ He also noted that there is „no clear answer‟ to the question of whether, on the
one hand, section 3(W) prevails over 23CA or, on the other; the two sections operate
independently of each other.15
13

Ibid, 9; M J Clarke, Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef, (Volume 1),
Commonwealth of Australia, November 2008, 51 <http://www.haneefcaseinquiry.gov.au> at
p.31 July 2009.
14
Law Council of Australia, Submission to Clarke Inquiry, p.9.
15
Clarke, Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef p.233. See also S Keim,
„Dr Haneef and Me‟, Speech to The Queensland Council for Civil Liberties Forty Year
Celebration Dinner, The Irish Club, Brisbane, 13 October 2007 and Submission to The Clarke
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Sections 23DA and 23CB: the investigation period and dead time
While Mohamed Haneef was held in custody awaiting a charge to be brought before
him, AFP and QPS officers who worked on the case made several (23DA) applications
to extend the investigation period and a number of (23CB) applications for specified
(dead) time. The two types of applications come under the Crimes Act and require
some explanation, but it is also important to understand the process by which the
investigating officers were able to make applications to extend the time that Haneef
was held in custody awaiting charge and have them accepted by a magistrate.
Accordingly, these applications and the process will be explained in tandem, beginning
with the 23DA applications.

However, it first needs to be noted that there is an inherent contradiction between
section 3(W) of the Crimes Act, which requires that an arrested person be released if
the investigating officer no longer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person
has committed the offence, and sections 23DA and 23CB. These sections enable the
police to make repeated applications for so-called „dead time‟ and, by so doing,
suspend the investigation (questioning) period giving them more time to collect, collate
and review evidence. As will be seen, the use made by the AFP of these inconsistent
sections in the Haneef case demonstrates the difficulty in interpreting and applying the
amendments to the Crimes Act that were introduced by the anti-terrorism legislation as
outlined above. They also strongly suggest that the AFP did not have „reasonable
grounds‟ to continue to hold Haneef in detention. The difficulties with interpretation and
application were compounded by the submission of inaccurate, limited and poorly
prepared evidence by the AFP.16

Part 1C of the Crimes Act enables a person who has been arrested for a terrorism
offence to be detained for a „reasonable investigation period‟ of up to but not
exceeding four hours. However, section 23DA of the Crimes Act enables an
application to be made to a magistrate to extend the investigation period for up to 20
hours. Thus the maximum investigation period during which a terror suspect can be

Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef, 20 May 2008, (NSW Council of Civil Liberties),
<http:///www.haneefcaseinquiry.gov.au> at 31 July 2009.
16
Ibid pp.56-73.
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detained is 24 hours. In so-called „ordinary‟ criminal cases, the initial investigation
period of four hours can only extended once and for a maximum of eight hours. While
section 23CA(8) disregards so-called „specific periods‟ when questioning of the
arrested person can be „reasonably suspended or delayed‟, section 23CB allows for an
application specifying a period of delay or suspension to be made to a magistrate.
Such a delay or suspension „is one of the categories of “dead time” under section
23CA(8), when the investigation period does not run.‟17 However, the „reasonable time‟
allowing for the „reasonable‟ suspension or delay of questioning of the suspect to be
subtracted from the investigation period as specified in sub-paragraph 23CA(8)(m) is a
category of dead time peculiar to terrorist cases.18

The first 23DA application for an eight hour extension to the investigation or
questioning period was made before the Brisbane Magistrates Court at 10:05am on 3
July 2007 (Haneef had been arrested at Brisbane International Airport at about
11:00pm the previous day). Magistrate Gordon authorised the extension on the basis
that he was satisfied that „the investigation into the offence was being conducted
properly and without delay and that Dr Haneef had been given the opportunity to make
representations about the application‟ and that the reasons for the extension contained
in the police application, including that urgent inquiries were continuing in the UK and
other countries, showed it was necessary. Formal questioning (the first interview) of
Haneef by Federal Agent Neil Thompson and Detective Sergeant Adam Simms of the
QPS began at about 11:00am on 3 July and came to an end at 5:31pm that afternoon
(a period of six-and-a-half hours including seven periods totalling 118 minutes when
the questioning was suspended).19

Release of the First Record of Interview
This account of the AFP‟s two applications for extending (or, suspending) the
investigation or questioning period now has to be interrupted, for the release of the first
17

Ibid p.55.
Law Council of Australia, Anti-Terrorism Reform Project: A Consolidation of the Law Council
of Australia’s advocacy in relation to Australia’s anti-terrorism measures, November 2008, p.59
<http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/initiatives/anti-terrorism_reform.cfm> at 15 August 2009.
19
Detective Sergeant Adam Simms, Interview with Mohamed Haneef (AFP Headquarters,
Brisbane), 3 July 2007. Clarke, Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef,
p.56. Note there is a typographical error on p 120 of the record of interview where the time
indicated is 6.48pm. Given that the interviewed concluded at 5.31pm, it would seem the correct
time was in fact 4.48pm.
18
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record of interview by Haneef‟s legal team needs some examination and explanation.
Hedley Thomas‟ breaking story in the first edition of The Australian on 18 July 2007 of
the release of the first record of interview between Dr Haneef and Federal Agent
Thompson and Detective Sergeant Simms, conducted at the AFP‟s headquarters in
Brisbane on 3 July 2007, was a defining event in the way the case came to be played
out.20 It also demonstrates the important role that the media came to play in the
unfolding of the case. On the evening of 18 July, Stephen Keim SC, Haneef‟s senior
legal counsel, disclosed that he had released the first record of interview with his
client.

The release of the first record of interview provided revealing insights into the less than
scrupulous and professional way in which the AFP was conducting the case. It
demonstrated, for example, that there were significant inconsistencies between the
information that had been provided by Haneef to the police in interview and the errors
of fact included in the AFP‟s court affidavit supporting its application to extend the
investigation period. In the interview with the AFP, Haneef had admitted that he had
lived in the British city of Liverpool with two other doctors but, contrary to the
information contained in the police affidavit, neither of these was Sabeel nor Kafeel
Ahmed. The record of interview also showed that Haneef had an explanation for his
travel plans to Bangalore, again contrary to the AFP‟s court affidavit which stated that
he „had no explanation‟ about having a one-way ticket.21
Interviewed by Tony Eastley of the ABC‟s AM programme on the morning the
transcript was released, AFP Commissioner Keelty claimed that the leak had
„undermined the prosecution…[and] provided information that should never have been
provided until the court had an opportunity to hear it for the first time and test the
veracity of the evidence.‟22 This was an odd statement given that Keelty knew, or
should have known, there was no evidence linking Haneef to the attempted terrorist
attacks in Britain or to any terrorist organisation. Keelty also suggested that a contempt
of court charge could be brought by the CDPP. For his part, Prime Minister Howard
20

Hedley Thomas, „Haneef: I‟m no radical‟, The Australian, (Sydney), 18 July 2007.
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22093642-601,00.html> at 31 July 2009.
21
Hedley Thomas, „Haneef dossier flawed”, The Australian, (Sydney), 20 July 2007
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22102633-601,00.html> at 31 July 2009.
22
ABC Radio, „Leaked Haneef transcript could affect court: Keelty‟, AM, 18 July 2007
<www.abc.net.au/am/content/2007/s1981358.htm> at 31 July 2009.
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denounced the release with the claim that „[w]hoever has been responsible for leaking
this documents is not trying to speed the course of justice … [they are] trying to
frustrate the process and it should be condemned.‟23

Claims that the case had been incompetently conducted by the AFP and the CDPP
were supported by Rafael Epstein‟s story, mentioned earlier, which demonstrated that
Dr Haneef‟s SIM card had not been found in the jeep which was crashed into Glasgow
Airport by Kafeel, but in Sabeel‟s home. Even though the British police had been
aware of this for six days, at no time did the AFP try to correct the error when it applied
to have the investigation period extended.

Stephen Keim justified leaking the first record of interview to the media by stating that
[d]efence counsel don‟t normally release the records of interview of their clients
in the media…because defence counsel don‟t normally have a document that
indicates so clearly the very thin case that the police are claiming to have, in
which to say that anything that my client has done was done in anything other
than an innocent manner.24
Keim also stated that „[m]y client…has a legal right to a copy of that document and that
document was provided to him without any restrictions whatsoever. He was perfectly
entitled, through me, to release that document.‟25 Noting that both „sides‟ had
attempted to use the media to their advantage, Keim observed that a double standard
had been employed by the AFP explaining that

there has been a campaign of leaks, including from this document [record of
interview], and from documents allegedly held by the police. There has been a
campaign of selective leaks against my client and these leaks have appeared
at least in The Daily Telegraph and in The Australian. As far as I know, no
cabinet minister has expressed any concern about those leaks, or the impact
that those leaks would have on the fair trial of my client.26
The Attorney-General Philip Ruddock labelled the release of the record of interview as
„inappropriate‟ and „highly unethical‟, but Keim was „unapologetic and happy to be held

23

ABC Radio, „Haneef barrister confirms interview leak, PM, 18 July 2007
<www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2007/s1982072.htm> at 31 July 2009.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
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accountable for his actions in releasing the document.‟27 The Australian reported that
the release of the record of interview by Keim „was widely backed by leading lawyers
yesterday amid fierce condemnation of the Attorney-General‟ while James Jupp, in a
piece on the Haneef case in the Democratic Audit of Australia, praised the release and
expressed gratitude for the „enterprise of Haneef‟s barrister and The Australian.‟28

The Second Application to Extend the Investigation Period and the
Applications for ‘dead time’
The second 23DA application was made, again before Magistrate Gordon, after
5:00pm on 3 July because the existing 12 hour time limit for the investigation period
was nearly up. It was made for similar reasons to the first, with Magistrate Gordon
again accepting that these reasons showed the extension of time was necessary. He
granted a „further and final‟ 12-hour extension of the investigation period which brought
it to 24 hours, the maximum limit. Mohamed Haneef declined to have legal
representation in relation to both the first and second 23DA applications.29 The
imminent expiry of the second 23DA application effectively triggered three specified or
dead time (23CB) applications (and a fourth, aborted, application). The first of these
was made before Magistrate Gordon some time after 10.30pm on 3 July by Federal
Agent John Matus and Mr Michael Rendina, Senior Lawyer, AFP Legal. The
application was for a period of 48 hours. It should be noted, however, that the period of
allowable dead time is not capped and is therefore virtually unlimited. Even the time
taken to process a dead time application is counted as dead time.30

In accordance with the reasons provided for under section 23CB to request dead time,
Matus and Rendina‟s application stated that it: would assist the investigation and
enable it to be completed; would allow for the collation and analysis of relevant
information obtained from UK and other overseas authorities; enable the collection,
collation and analysis of relevant material from a range of sources; and, facilitate the
collection of relevant information from overseas places in different time zones,
27

Ibid. For an analysis of the use of the media by Haneef‟s legal representatives, see Alysia
Debowski, „Old dogs, new tricks: Public interest lawyering in an “Age of Terror”‟ (2009) 34
Alternative Law Journal, 1, 15-20.
28
Thomas, „Haneef dossier flawed‟; James Jupp, ‘The case of Dr Haneef’, (Discussion Paper
13/07, Democratic Audit of Australia, Australian National University, July 2007) p.3.
29
Clarke,Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef, p.57.
30
Law Council of Australia, Anti-Terrorism Reform Project p.60.
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including the UK.31 Magistrate Gordon accepted all these reasons and signed the
certificate specifying 48 hours of dead time.
The second dead time application was „substantially drafted‟ by Rendina and
contained similar information and reasons for requesting dead time as contained in the
first application, but this time was signed by Detective Sergeant Simms. The
application was for a period of 96 hours (four days) and was made in the chambers of
Magistrate Gordon after 6.30pm on 5 July.32 Rendina and Simms were present, and
AFP Commander Ramzi Jabbour, Manager Counter-Terrorism Domestic, and Federal
Agent Michelle Gear waited outside. Gordon authorised the application at about 7.00
the same evening. Arrangements for Peter Russo, a solicitor from the law firm Ryan
and Bosscher, to represent Dr Haneef had been made earlier. However, Russo was
requested to leave Gordon‟s chambers during the reading of the application because it
contained „sensitive information‟.33

A third dead time application was made before Magistrate Gordon on 9 July at about
4.00 in the afternoon and sought a further 120 hours (five days) of dead time. Simms
and Rendina represented the AFP and Mohamed Haneef was represented by senior
counsel Stephen Keim. Keim opposed the third application on the basis that the „rules
of natural justice‟ required Haneef and his legal representatives to be informed of the
material that the AFP had placed before the magistrate. Countering Keim‟s
submission, Rendina argued that „Part 1C of the Crimes Act did not contain a
requirement to provide material to the arrested person and that public interest
immunity would be claimed to prevent disclosure of the material.‟34 Magistrate Gordon
gave qualified support to the third application, specifying a further 48 hours of dead
time (considerably less than the five days requested by the AFP). However, he
directed that the matter be brought back to him in two days time (11 July).

A fourth 23CB application for specified or dead time was duly made on 11 July,
seeking a further 72 hours of dead time (the remainder of the 120 hours that had been
31

The Clarke Report states that they applied under s 23CB for the dead time, but then goes on
to state that the final application, signed by Matus, was made under s 23CA (8)(m). Clarke
Inquiry, pp.58-59.
32
Ibid p.60.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid p.62.
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requested on 9 July). An „unclassified‟ statutory declaration by Detective Sergeant
Simms of the QPS stating, amongst other things, that a further 72 hours would ‟enable
authorities to pursue further vital investigative avenues concerning Dr Haneef‟s
involvement in the alleged offence‟ was provided to Haneef‟s lawyers on 11 July.35
However, citing public interest grounds, the AFP sought to prevent disclosure to
Haneef and his lawyers of two confidential statutory declarations that contained
„classified‟ information. While the AFP provided the Clarke Inquiry with a copy of one of
the confidential declarations, the Inquiry only received an unsigned copy of the other
because the AFP was unable to locate the signed copy.36 At the hearing of the fourth
application, Haneef‟s lawyers „made an application for Magistrate Gordon to disqualify
himself on the ground of apprehended bias…[the] application was made on the
magistrate‟s involvement in the previous AFP applications that had been made in the
absence of Dr Haneef.‟37

The fourth dead time application was withdrawn by the AFP on 13 July, evidently
because it believed that there was little prospect in the short term of gaining any
further relevant information while the investigation period was suspended. Later in the
afternoon of the same day, formal questioning (the second interview) of Dr Haneef
began, in the presence of Mr Russo, his solicitor. The interview ran for about 15 hours
(13-14 July), including a number of breaks, and both audio and video recordings were
made. However, as Clarke notes in his report,
[t]he recording equipment did not capture the resumption of the interview [after
a suspension], from 5.01 to 5.57am, or the conclusion of the interview, between
6.58 and 7.00 am (during which Dr Haneef was advised that he was being
charged).38

The Charge Against Haneef and the Second Record of Interview
It was noted earlier on that Dr Haneef was finally charged on 14 July with one offence
of recklessly providing support to a terrorist organisation on the grounds that his
Subscriber Information Module (SIM) card was connected to failed terrorist attacks in
Britain (contrary to section 102.7(2) of the Commonwealth Criminal Code). In his
report, Justice Clarke outlined in detail the „Fault Elements‟ in this section that are
35

Detective Sergent Adam Simms, Queensland Police Service, cited in ibid 64.
Ibid 63.
37
Ibid 64.
38
Ibid 65.
36
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contained in chapter 2.2, division 5 of the Code. Issues relevant to these elements that
were noted by Clarke include the meaning of intention, recklessness, negligence and
so on. He concluded that the fault elements „were a distortion of English‟ and
„confusing and tautologous‟ and recommended that the section be amended because
it could lead to „judicial error‟ in its application.39 The Law Council of Australia also
expressed a number of serious concerns with the criminal offences contained in
division 102 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. These concerns include: the
terrorist organisation offences cast the net of criminal liability too widely by
criminalising a person‟s associations, as opposed to their individual conduct‟; [existing
principles of] „accessorial liability … draw a more appropriate line between direct and
intentional engagement in criminal activity and peripheral association‟; [the
criminalisation of a person‟s associations has harmful implications for freedom of
association and expression and is likely to subject certain sections of the population to
criminal sanction] „simply because of their familial, religious or community
connections‟; and, [the reach of the terrorist organisation offences] is „unknown and
unknowable … because the definition of a terrorist organisation incorporates any
organisation, whether it is listed by regulation or not, which satisfies the broad and
imprecise criteria set out in sub-section 102.1(a)‟.40
The second record of interview was released by Haneef‟s legal representatives on 22
August 2007, nearly a month after the charge against him was withdrawn. The second
release raised yet more questions about the information contained in the records of
interview and the information provided to the court and released to the media by the
AFP. On 23 August, the day after the second release, the AFP felt compelled to deny
publicly that it had „improperly leaked information‟ and also accused Haneef‟s lawyers
of „running their case in the media‟. Evidently, any irony was unintended. The AFP also
denied that its officers had selectively leaked information to damage Dr Haneef‟s case
and reputation, claiming that the „continuing attempt by Dr Haneef‟s defence team to
use the media to run their case is both unprofessional and inappropriate…the AFP has
acted appropriately throughout the investigation.‟41 A month earlier, on 23 July,
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Commissioner Keelty had had to admit that allegations linking Dr Haneef with a plot to
bomb the Q1 skyscraper on the Gold Coast were „inaccurate‟ but also had to deny that
the AFP was the source of the false allegations.42 However, by AFP design or not, Dr
Haneef‟s character and reputation had again been called into question.

The AFP, the CDPP and the Howard Government
The charge against Dr Haneef was withdrawn by the CDPP on 27 July 2007. This
caused the Howard Government immediately to seek to distance itself from the
ignominy and recrimination rapidly gathering around the case. Mr Howard, who was
visiting Bali at the end of July 2007, publicly called on AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty
and Director of the CDPP Damian Bugg QC to explain the debacle. Howard told
reporters
[b]earing in mind that the detention of the man was undertaken by the police,
and not at the request or encouragement of the government, and the case was
prepared and presented by the DPP, I think that the right thing now is for those
two men to explain the process, and explain the reasons…Prime Ministers
don‟t conduct prosecutions.43
In response, Damian Bugg had to acknowledge that „a mistake had been made‟ and
accepted that the CDPP was responsible for one of two errors of fact put before the
court, that is, that the notorious SIM card had been found at the scene of Kafeel‟s
Glasgow misadventure.44 The other error of fact, that Haneef had lived with Sabeel
and Kafeel in the UK, he blamed on the AFP. However, Keelty for his part claimed that
the AFP had acted on the DPP‟s advice that „there was sufficient evidence to charge
Haneef‟.45 Nevertheless, in its submission to the Clarke Inquiry, the CDPP stated that it
had not been provided by the AFP with the record of the first interview with Haneef nor
information about the material found on Sabeel‟s laptop that had been seized by UK
police.46
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Despite Bugg‟s assertions, the decision finally to charge Haneef relied on advice
provided to the AFP by Clive Porritt of the CDPP. Porritt first met with the investigative
team a full 10 days after Haneef‟s arrest. Moreover,
[a]t that meeting, Porritt was informed that Haneef‟s SIM card had been found
on Kafeel Ahmed at Glasgow - an inaccuracy which was corrected the
following day by the AFP in the briefing paper for Porritt, but was never
specifically drawn to his attention.‟47
The briefing paper also suggested that Dr Haneef had no explanation for his travel at
the time of his arrest and that he had lived in the same house in England with Sabeel
and Kafeel. As noted above, these were both errors of fact. In any event, there was
hardly a consensus view amongst the members of the investigative team that Porritt‟s
advice warranted bringing a charge against Haneef. Indeed, the two police officers
who conducted the first interview with Dr Haneef, Federal Agent Thompson and
Detective Sergeant Simms believed there was not enough evidence against Dr Haneef
to sustain a charge and refused to add their names to the charge sheet.48 Clarke
observed that both officers „felt under considerable pressure at this time‟.49

The AFP, and its Commissioner Mick Keelty, fared even less well than the CDPP in
the wash-up of the case. In its submission to the Clarke Inquiry, the AFP claimed that
its officers had „acted professionally‟ and were motivated only „by the need to protect
the Australian public and public interests.‟50 However, in commenting on the role of
AFP, particularly counter-terrorism commander Ramzi Jabbour, Clarke was far from
flattering. Not only was the evidence used to charge Haneef „completely deficient‟,
Jabbour, who was otherwise an „impressive, dedicated and capable‟ officer, was in this
instance „unable to see that the evidence he regarded as highly incriminating in fact
amounted to very little.‟51 Clarke also observed that Jabbour had „lost objectivity‟ a
damning indictment of such a leading figure in Australia‟s „war on terror‟. As already
47

Andrew Lynch, „Learning from Haneef‟, Inside Story, 5 February 2009, p.2
<http://inside.org.au/learning-from-haneef> at 31 July 2009.
48
David Marr and Geesche Jacobsen, „AFP accepts no blame in Haneef case‟, The Sydney
Morning Herald (Sydney), 24 October 2008 <http://www.smh.com.au/new/national/afp-acceptsno-blame-in-haneef-case/2008/10/23/1224351449265.html> at 31 July 2009.
49
Clarke cited in ibid.
50
Australian Federal Police submission cited in ibid.
51
Clarke cited in David Marr, „ASIO knew he was clean on day 2‟, The Sydney Morning Herald
(Sydney), 24 December 2008 <http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/asio-knew-he-wasclean/2008/12/23/1229998528332.html> at 31 July 2009.

140

seen, and beginning with the release of the first record of interview, the Haneef case
had already brought Keelty into the public and media spotlight. The collapse of the
case is widely regarded as having led to his resignation from the AFP on 6 May 2009,
which took effect on 2 September.52 Many commentators in the media held Keelty to
be ultimately accountable for the AFP‟s leaking of incorrect and misleading information
to the press, and for the errors of fact contained in the material provided to the CDPP
by the AFP, all of which have already been well rehearsed in this paper.53

The Haneef case naturally produced scepticism and unease in the Australian
community about the way the in which the case had been handled by the Howard
Government and by the AFP and the CDPP. Central to these concerns and misgivings
were the former Government‟s apparent attempts to use the legal system and law
enforcement agencies as vehicles for pursuing its political and ideological agenda in
the run-up to the 2007 Federal election and the manner in which this was seen to
compromise long-established legal principles and presumptive rights. The role of
Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews is instructive in this respect.
The Migration Act gave Andrews very wide discretion to use the Act’s character test to
revoke the visas of non-citizens like Haneef. There is obviously no doubt that Haneef
knew, through kinship ties, Sabeel Ahmed the brother of Kafeel who had crazily
attacked the Glasgow Airport but whether these ties were actual associations with
criminal suspects was at the time a matter of considerable conjecture.54 In such cases,
the Immigration Minister would also have been able to use the even broader
justifications of „national interest‟ or „national security‟ to cancel a visa. However, at the
time that Haneef was granted bail and subsequently had his visa cancelled, Andrews
did not use either of these justifications but claimed that his decision was consistent
with secret evidence supplied to him by the AFP.55 By the time the Clarke Inquiry
52
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commenced on 30 April 2008, however, it was being reported that Andrews would
testify to the inquiry that the AFP had withheld from him the important information
which proved that Sabeel Ahmed was not a member of a terrorist organisation and
was not involved in the attempted London nightclub and Glasgow Airport bombings.56
And, as noted above, Spender J of the Federal Court, in overturning the Minister‟s
decision to cancel Haneef‟s visa, was pointedly critical of the latter‟s selective public
release of this protected information while not being prepared to divulge any of it to the
court.57
In any event, the Minister‟s dealings with the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation (ASIO), and the advice which it gave to the government, are even more
baffling. ASIO did not have enough evidence to issue an adverse security assessment
in relation to Haneef – which is the equivalent of issuing a non-adverse assessment.
Its assessment was thus inconsistent with that made by the AFP, and ASIO repeatedly
provided this advice to the government as the affair progressed. The Minister knew of
ASIO‟s advice at the time that he made his decision to cancel Haneef‟s visa but gave it
„no weight‟. Instead, he claimed perversely that „he was not aware that ASIO had
found no evidence of Haneef‟s foreknowledge of or involvement in the United Kingdom
incidents‟ and „[s]omewhat astoundingly…said even if he had known he didn‟t think it
would have made any difference [to his decision to cancel the doctor‟s visa].‟58 The
Attorney General also knew of ASIO‟s advice. For ASIO‟s part, in its submission to the
Clarke Inquiry, it stated that it had „“consistently” advised the Howard government that
it had no evidence connecting Haneef to a British terrorist plot, days before the
government stripped the Indian doctor of his visa.‟59 A series of emails between AFP
officers and staff in the Minister‟s office, published in The Australian in late 2007,
suggested the existence of, what the journalist called a „secret plan‟, to ensure that
Haneef would remain in custody even if granted bail by Payne M. Nevertheless, a
spokesperson for the Minister stated that „there was absolutely no deal or arrangement
or contingency instigated or discussed by the minister or any of his staff at all, ever.‟ 60
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Well-known defence barrister, Greg Barns, took a different view of the emails. He
suggested that the emails demonstrated that „the AFP in conjunction with the
[g]overnment were essentially completely undermining the judicial process. They were
ripping up the doctrine of the separation of powers.‟61
More worryingly from the point of view of unrestrained „executive over-reach‟, it was
revealed in a case heard before the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal
(AAT) in 2007 that representatives of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
met on 4 July with officials from the Departments of Immigration and Citizenship and
Foreign Affairs and Trade to discuss how the Haneef case should be handled. The
action in the AAT was initiated by Haneef‟s lawyers in a bid to assist the Clarke Inquiry
to procure documents relating to the case, because the Clarke Inquiry itself did not
have the power to compel the production of such documents by government
departments and agencies. One of the documents sought in the action was the options
paper developed by those departments represented at the 4 July meeting, which set
out the possible courses of action that could be taken should the AFP decide to bring
charges against Haneef. In the view of Haneef‟s lawyers, „the involvement of Mr
Howard‟s department raised the possibility the former Prime Minister may have
colluded with his Immigration Minister to create a political storm similar to the Tampa
controversy which helped the Coalition win the 2001 election.‟62 It is inconceivable that
the Prime Minister was not briefed by his senior advisors about the meeting. While
most of the requested documents were provided to Haneef‟s legal team, about 15
documents that government lawyers claimed either were subject to public interest
immunity or were exempt from freedom of information legislation were not released.
The Department of Immigration and Citizenship refused to release the options paper to
the AAT.

Well into 2009, the Haneef case was still able to attract significant media attention not
least because the drama which he endured continued to be entwined with that of some
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of the other important players, most notably retired AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty. 63
At a more elevated level, the case remains for many Australians a troubling episode in
the history of Australia‟s „war on terror‟ because it demonstrated some unpleasant and
unwelcome facts about how the country‟s political, law enforcement and legal systems
have been distorted by the strategy adopted to deal with the terrorism threat. These
distortions originated in the Howard Government‟s legislative panic after the events of
September 11, 2001 - a panic which continued for the remainder of its time in office.

The Clarke Inquiry, the Media and Haneef
As early as July 2007, at about the same time as the release of the first record of
interview, the federal opposition and organisations such as the Australian Council for
Civil Liberties began calling for an independent, judicial inquiry into the case. For their
part, the Australian Greens Party wanted a Royal Commission to investigate the case
(a Royal Commission has far more extensive coercive powers than a judicial inquiry
including the ability to compel witnesses to give evidence and produce documents).64
As the federal election approached, and more information relating to political
interference in the case came to light, the calls from the opposition for an inquiry grew
louder. On 3 November 2007, the Leader of the Opposition said that, if elected, a
Commonwealth government formed by the Australian Labor Party would hold a full
judicial inquiry into the Haneef case. This commitment came after it was confirmed that
an AFP officer and staff member of the Minister had in fact developed the contingency
(or, „secret‟) plan referred to above to ensure that Haneef would remain in custody
under the Migration Act even if a magistrate released him. The information was
contained in an email sent from the AFP to the Department of Immigration and
Citizenship, and was obtained by Haneef‟s lawyers following a freedom of information
application in their quest to have the doctor‟s visa reinstated.65

Labour Commonwealth Attorney General, Robert McClelland, announced on 14 March
2008 that John Clarke QC, a former New South Wales Supreme Court judge, would
conduct a judicial inquiry into the Haneef affair. The Clarke Inquiry was asked to
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examine and report on „the arrest, detention, charging, prosecution and release of
Haneef, the cancellation of his Australian visa and issuing of a criminal justice stay
certificate.‟66 Among its other terms of reference, the Clarke Inquiry, like the earlier
Street Review (which was commissioned to examine the AFP‟s and ASIO‟s
investigation into, and the failed prosecution of, terrorism suspect Izhar Ul-Haque)67,
was to examine and report

on improving co-operation,

co-ordination and

„interoperability‟ between Commonwealth agencies including the AFP, ASIO and the
CDPP.

The Clarke Inquiry was for the most part conducted in private (the opening day of the
inquiry and a one-day public hearing on 30 April 2008 were its only public hearings). It
was not given the power to compel witnesses to give evidence or face crossexamination, and witnesses were not given indemnity against defamation or selfincrimination. In all, the Clarke Inquiry made ten recommendations, the most important
of these being „that consideration be given to the appointment of an independent
reviewer of Commonwealth counter-terrorism laws‟.68 The Rudd Government has
accepted this recommendation but has been slow in putting it into effect.69
Commenting on the release of Clarke‟s report, just before Christmas 2008, George
Williams noted that „it exposed in graphic detail the mishandling of the case and the
flaws and deficiencies in the law…but made a disappointing set of recommendations.‟
Even though the legislation used in the Haneef case allows for the indefinite detention
of a person who has not been charged with a criminal offence, „Clarke passed the
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buck in finding that the legislation should be reviewed again by someone else‟.70 The
Clarke Inquiry also drew criticism for its failure to „unearth improper political
interference or opportunism‟. Andrew Lynch, for example, attributes this to restrictions
on who could give evidence and what they were able or willing to say when they did.
He points out that the Immigration Minister‟s „former chief of staff declined to provide a
statement, while … [the Prime Minister] neither provided a statement himself nor
granted permission for his former advisor, Jamie Fox, to do so‟.71 For his part, the then
Attorney General, whose portfolio responsibilities included the AFP and ASIO, did
speak to the Clarke Inquiry but only for about an hour. And, Clarke had considerable
difficulty in gaining access to Cabinet (including National Security Committee)
documents.
In the early stages of the case, as the Australian Press Council‟s review of the press
media‟s coverage of Haneef highlights, the media was primarily concerned with the
narrow criminal and law and order dimensions of the case.72 Its human rights
dimensions, and the broader implications of the counter-terrorism measures contained
in Australia‟s terrorism law for the rights and liberties of Australians and for the rule of
law in this country, were largely overlooked. It was only as the case proceeded and
gathered momentum with the release of the first and second records of interview that
these broader dimensions began to become more prominent themes in the reporting of
the case. And, as the media began to include these broader dimensions in its
coverage, so did other major issues become media freedom and how the various
parties involved in the case, in particular, the Government, its senior ministers and the
AFP attempted to use the media to their advantage by discrediting Haneef and his
legal counsel. The important point to be drawn from the Haneef case is that media
scrutiny of executive government and the protection of human rights and civil liberties,
and ultimately the protection of national security, are inextricably linked in Australia as
in any other country. As executive government steadily grows in power in Australia and
other democratic countries around the world, and the counter-balancing power of
parliaments and legislatures declines in proportion, it becomes increasingly important
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for the media and other civil society organisations to hold the executive, and the law
enforcement, prosecuting and security agencies it oversees accountable and
answerable for their actions.

Conclusion
The Haneef case demonstrates how the operationalisation of Australia‟s counterterrorism strategy can so adversely affect the human and legal rights, in effect, of any
individual going about their day-to-day business unmotivated by any intention to plan,
prepare for, or conspire with others to commit a terrorist act. After all, it is not very
significant for people to give their mobile phone SIM card or a mobile phone itself to
relatives or friends without regard to whether or not at some time in the future it might
become involved through no fault of their own in a terrorist incident or be somehow
entwined in a terrorist fiasco. Thus, the case also demonstrates the need for careful,
sensitive

and

highly

professional

investigations,

intelligence

collection

and

prosecutions in such cases that are free from unwarranted or improper interference by
the political executive. Any attempt by the political executive to exceed its authority in
this way should be exposed and detailed by the media, as it was in this case. It
remains to be seen whether the case of Dr Mohamed Haneef will turn out to be unique
in this respect.
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